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3.1    Introduction
Increasing labor force participation among older workers is an important 
issue on the scientiﬁ  c and policy agenda in the United States and other 
industrialized countries. Major categories of individuals who are out of the 
labor force at later ages consist of persons drawing disability beneﬁ  ts, unem-
ployment beneﬁ  ts, and early retirement beneﬁ  ts. Cross-  country diﬀerences 
in the prevalence of early retirement are clearly related to diﬀerences in 
ﬁ  nancial incentives (Gruber and Wise 2003; Börsch- Supan 2007). The frac-
tion of workers on disability insurance is vastly diﬀerent across countries 
with similar levels of economic development and comparable access to mod-
ern medical technology and treatment.
Health is also a major determinant of economic inactivity, and those 
who have a health problem that limits them in their daily activities or in the 
amount or kind of work they can do (a “work disability”) are much less likely 
to work for pay than others (Stapleton and Burkhauser 2003). In view of 
the aging of the workforce in developed countries, reducing work disability 
among the working population and particularly among older workers may 
have a major impact on the sustainability of social security and health care 
systems, among other things. Institutional diﬀerences in eligibility rules, 
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workplace accommodation of older or sick workers, or generosity of bene-
ﬁ  ts, contribute to explaining the diﬀerences in disability rolls (cf., e.g., Bound 
and Burkhauser 1999; Autor and Duggan 2003; and Börsch-  Supan 2007). 
Recent survey data show, however, that signiﬁ  cant diﬀerences between coun-
tries are also found in self-  reports of work-  limiting disabilities and general 
health (Banks et al. 2009).
In this chapter we use data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics 
(PSID) and the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) to study 
the labor force dynamics in the United States and in thirteen European 
countries. To focus on labor market dynamics in the pre- retirement years and 
because these dynamics are likely to diﬀer by gender, we concentrate on the 
age group between forty and sixty- ﬁ  ve and consider males and females sepa-
rately. We also investigate the dynamics of work disability (i.e., the extent 
to which work disability varies over time and its reversibility) and how this 
varies across countries. One of the questions we address is whether we can 
explain the prevalence of self- reported work disability as a function of indi-
vidual characteristics, including general health.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 3.2 the 
details of the data that are used are described. Section 3.3 discusses some 
pertinent characteristics of institutions in Europe and the United States 
that relate especially to the incentives and institutions of work disability 
programs. Section 3.4 presents the model that is used to describe labor force 
dynamics in the various countries. The model is estimated for each country 
separately. Section 3.5 presents the estimation results. In section 3.6, we sum-
marize the implications of these results by showing simulations, where we 
assign U.S. parameter values to the models for the European countries. The 
implied diﬀerences in outcomes can be seen as a counterfactual simulation 
of the impact U.S. policies and institutions would have when implemented 
in European countries. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2    Data
Our data come from two sources: the European Community Household 
Panel (ECHP) and the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). Both data 
sets have reasonably comparable measures of labor force activity and self-
  assessed work disability for the countries that will be included in our anal-
ysis. We discuss some issues related to the comparability of measurement of 
these key concepts in section 3.5.
The ECHP is an annual longitudinal survey of households in the EU.1 
Data were collected by national statistical agencies under the supervision 
and coordination of Eurostat (the statistical oﬃce of the EU). Table 3A.1, 
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taken from Eurostat (2003, 15), gives an overview of the waves of ECHP in 
all ﬁ  fteen countries that participated in the ECHP project.
The ECHP started in 1994 and was terminated in 2001. The ﬁ  rst wave 
covered some 60,500 households and some 130,000 adults age sixteen and 
above from all countries except Austria, Finland, and Sweden. Austria and 
Finland were added in the second and third waves. As of the fourth wave, 
the original ECHP survey was terminated in Germany, Luxembourg, and 
the United Kingdom. Comparable data for these countries were obtained 
from existing national panels. For the United Kingdom this was the British 
Household Panel Survey (BHPS), for Germany the Socio-  Economic Panel 
(SOEP), and for Luxembourg the PSELL (Panel socio- économique Liewen 
zu Lëtzebuerg). For these countries we will use the existing national panels 
rather than the few waves of the ECHP. As of the fourth wave, data for 
Sweden were obtained from the Swedish Living Conditions Survey. Since 
this is not a panel, we will exclude Sweden from our analysis. We will also not 
use the Luxembourg data, since it provides no information on self- reported 
disability.
The Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) has gathered almost thirty 
years of extensive economic and demographic data on a nationally rep-
resentative sample of approximately 5,000 (original) families and 35,000 
individuals who live in these families. Details on labor market activity and 
family income and its components have been gathered in each wave since 
the inception of PSID in 1968. The PSID has been collecting information 
on self-  reported general health status (the standard ﬁ  ve-  point scale from 
excellent to poor) since 1984 and has always collected good information on 
work-  related disabilities. To provide comparability in the time period with 
the EHCP, our analysis will use the PSID waves between 1995 and 2003. It 
should be noted that after the 1999 wave the PSID is no longer annual, but 
biannual.
3.3    Institutions
There exists great variation in labor market institutions across the Organ-
ization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries; 
regulations with respect to disability insurance are certainly no exception. To 
get a very broad overview for a majority of countries in our sample, ﬁ  gure 3.1 
reports a crude measure of the generosity of disability beneﬁ  ts—the fraction 
of gross domestic product (GDP) accounted for by public expenditures on 
disability beneﬁ  ts. Considerable variation across OECD countries is readily 
apparent, with France and Italy spending less than 1 percent of GDP and 
three countries—Sweden, Denmark, and the Netherlands—spending more 
than twice that level. Using this metric, the United States ranks lower than 
any of the OECD countries listed in ﬁ  gure 3.1. The variation in spending 66        Arie Kapteyn, James P.  Smith, Arthur van Soest, and James Banks
levels can of course be due to variation in beneﬁ  t levels or variation in eligi-
bility, or some combination of both.
Looking more deeply into international variation than the simple gen-
erosity measure previously presented, various dimensions can be distin-
guished. The main ones are the loss of earnings capacity required to qualify 
for beneﬁ  ts and the way in which such loss of earnings capacity is assessed, 
eligibility requirements based on work or contribution history, and beneﬁ  t 
levels in relation to loss of earnings capacity. Table 3A.2 provides an over-
view of the main features of disability insurance systems in the countries 
we study in this chapter.
Table 3A.2 illustrates the complexity of these disability programs across 
countries. For example, while many countries have a basic ﬁ  ve year’s mini-
mum period of eligibility (e.g., Germany, Austria, Italy, Portugal), basic 
eligibility is as low as six months in Belgium and one year in France, while 
one is not fully covered unless one has worked for ten years in the United 
States. Similarly, while the loss of normal earnings capacity is suﬃcient to 
qualify for eligibility in Spain, one must have a loss of two- thirds of earnings 
capacity in France, Belgium, and Portugal.
Not surprisingly, the variation in Disability Insurance (DI) systems iden-
tiﬁ  ed in table 3A.2 is correlated with diﬀerences in prevalence of DI receipt 
across countries and in the disability status of individuals receiving DI. 
Börsch-  Supan (2007) showed that a cross-  sectional context variation in 
Fig. 3.1    Public expenditure on disability beneﬁ  ts
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incentives and institutional rules across a series of European countries and 
the United States can account for diﬀerences across these countries in the 
fractions of individuals on work disability programs. In contrast, variation 
in demographic attributes and health across these countries did little to 
explain these diﬀerences.
In this chapter, we do not attempt to analyze being on the disability rolls 
but instead aim at explaining the cross-  sectional and dynamic variation 
across countries in self-  assessed work disability and work. Table 3.1 shows 
for 2001 the relation between what is probably the best single measure of the 
scope of a country’s disability program, the fraction of disability beneﬁ  ts as 
a fraction of GDP, and the fraction of men who self-  report that they have 
a work disability.2 There appears to be almost no correlation between these 
two measures. Although the incentives and institutions across countries 
appear to have a great deal to do with the fraction of workers who are on dis-
ability programs, these incentives and institutions appear to be only weakly 
related to the fraction of men who claim that they are work disabled.
Table 3A.3, taken from a recent OECD study, provides information on 
some characteristics of DI recipients for most of the countries we are con-
sidering in this chapter. The ﬁ  rst column shows that a substantial fraction 
2. The exact question on work disability in ECHP is: “Are you hampered in your daily 
activities by any physical or mental health problem, illness or disability?” In the PSID, it is: 
“Do you have any physical or nervous condition that limits the type of work or the amount 
of work you can do?”
Table 3.1  Expenditures on disability insurance and self-  reported male work 
disability, 2001
     
DI expenditure 
as a % of GDP  
Self- reported  male 
work disability, 






United Kingdom 2.2 13.1
Ireland 1.3 15.7






  United States   1.1   19.3  
Source: DI expenditures: World Bank (2006). Self-  reported male disability: ECHP and PSID 
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of the people on DI declare that they have no work disability. This fraction 
varies a lot across countries and is particularly large in Sweden (48.9 percent) 
and the United States (46.7 percent). Either people are granted DI beneﬁ  ts 
while not acknowledging disability status, or those who recover from their 
disability are not able to ﬁ  nd a job and instead stay on DI, or some combi-
nation of both. The third column of table 3A.3 shows indeed that exit rates 
from DI are extremely low. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands seem 
to be the exceptions in this respect, but this might have to do with reforms 
in the disability insurance system in these countries.
The second column of table 3A.3 shows the other side of the coin—many 
people who report to have a (moderate or severe) work disability receive 
neither earnings nor DI or other beneﬁ  ts. Again, variation across countries 
is substantial. In Sweden, almost everyone with a work disability has earn-
ings from work or receives beneﬁ  ts, but in Spain and Italy, 28 or 29 percent 
receive neither of the two. The United States has an intermediate position 
in this respect.
Column (4) shows that the expected negative relation between disability 
and the chances of being employed holds in all countries: the relative em-
ployment rate is always less than one. Still, there are substantial diﬀerences 
across countries. In Spain, someone with a work disability is 0.41 times as 
likely to do paid work as someone without a work disability, compared to 
0.79 in Switzerland. Again, the United States is somewhere in the middle 
with 0.58. Column (5) shows that there is an earnings diﬀerential between 
workers with and without a work disability, but in most countries, it is not 
very large. Here the United States and (surprisingly) Sweden are the excep-
tions—with workers with a disability earning almost 30 percent less than 
workers without disability.3
On the other hand, for those with a work disability, working seems to be 
an eﬀective way of increasing income, as is borne out by column (6). This is 
particularly true in the United States, where the disabled who work have an 
average income that is 2.84 times as high as the average income of disabled 
who do not work. In Europe, the diﬀerences are smaller, but even in Sweden 
and Denmark, the countries with the lowest income diﬀerentials between 
working and nonworking disabled persons, the diﬀerence is still 37 or 38 per-
cent. These cross-  country diﬀerences seem to be in line with the generosity 
of disability insurance systems (as indicated by ﬁ  gure 3.1, for example).
3.4    The  Model
In this section, we outline our model of the interrelated dynamics of self-
  reported work disability and labor force status (work versus no work). The 
equation for disability of individual i in time period t is speciﬁ  ed as:
3. A complete analysis of this eﬀect would need to account additionally for diﬀerential selec-
tion into the labor market across countries.Labor Market Status and Transitions during the Pre-Retirement Years    6 9
(1)  D∗
it   X  it D    D
D Di,t 1    D
WWi,t 1    i
D   εit
D
 D it   1[D∗
it   0].
Here Dit indicates the presence of self-  reported work disability; 0 means 
no disability and 1 means disability. Lagged labor force status is denoted 
by an indicator variable W i,t– 1   1 if the respondent worked in the previous 
period and W i,t– 1   0 otherwise. The error terms εit
D are assumed to be inde-
pendent standard normal;  i
D is an individual eﬀect, normally distributed 
with variance  2
 . The εit
D and  i
D are assumed mutually independent and 
independent of the vector of explanatory variables Xit.
Thus, there are two direct sources of persistence in the disability equation: 
the lagged dependent variable Di,t– 1 and the unobserved heterogeneity term 
 i
D. We allow for a lagged eﬀect of workforce status on work disability, but 
not for a contemporaneous eﬀect. That is, we are eﬀectively assuming no 
contemporaneous “justiﬁ  cation bias” in self-  reported disability (justiﬁ  ca-
tion bias would imply that people say they have a work disability to justify 
their nonwork status).
The second equation explains whether respondents do paid work or not. 
Labor force status Wit is explained by a Probit equation as follows:
(2)  W∗
it   X  it W    D
WDi,t 1    W
WW i,t 1    d
WDi,t    i
W   εit
W
 W it   1[W∗
it   0].
Thus, we allow for both a contemporaneous and a lagged eﬀect of work 
disability on labor force status. The assumptions about individual eﬀects and 
error terms are the same as before. We do not allow for correlation between 
the error terms in the two equations, but we do allow for correlated indi-
vidual eﬀects. Also here, there are two direct sources of persistence: lagged 
labor force status W i,t– 1 and the individual eﬀect  i
W.
The variance-  covariance matrix of the individual eﬀects is unrestricted. 
For estimation purposes we parameterize it as follows. Let ui   (ui
D, ui
W) ~ 
N2(0,I). Then we specify the vector of individual eﬀects  i   ( i
D,  i
W) as 
     u, with
(3)  Λ   












a lower triangular matrix. The parameter estimates summarized in the next 
section include the estimates of the entries in Λ.
To account for the initial conditions problem, we follow Heckman (1981), 
Hyslop (1999), and Vella and Verbeek (1999) and specify separate equations 
for wave 1. These equations have the same exogenous regressors and con-
temporaneous dependent variables on the right-  hand side as the dynamic 
equations just presented, but do not include the lagged dependent vari-
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coeﬃcients in the dynamic equations. These coeﬃcients are estimated jointly 
with the parameters in the dynamic equations and can be seen as nuisance 
 parameters.
In the initial condition equations, we include arbitrary linear combina-
tions of the individual eﬀects in the two dynamic equations. This is the same 
as including an arbitrary linear combination of the two entries in ui. The 
estimated coeﬃcients of these linear combinations can be seen as nuisance 
parameters.
The previous equations must be slightly adapted for the PSID data. In the 
PSID, the frequency of interviewing was reduced from once a year to once 
every two years starting in 1997.4 As a result, for the more recent years a 
lagged variable in the PSID model refers to a value two years ago. Hence, in 
the model for the PSID data we include separate coeﬃcients for the lagged 
variables for the case that the previous wave is one year ago and the case that 
the previous wave is two years ago.5
3.5    Results
Our focus in this research is on the dynamics of disability and labor force 
activity during the pre-  retirement years. These labor market dynamics are 
likely to be very diﬀerent than those that characterize the period of labor 
market entry when people are ﬁ  rst entering the labor market. Therefore, 
we estimate our models on samples of people who are age forty and over. 
Separate models are estimated for men and women given that the dynamics 
of labor force behavior are potentially very diﬀerent.
A problem that requires special attention in an exercise like this is the 
international comparability of variable deﬁ  nitions. For example, if schools 
are organized in very diﬀerent ways in diﬀerent countries (as they are), it 
would be very diﬃcult to know what it would mean to make comparisons 
across countries that “assume” that the schooling levels of workers are the 
same.
For that reason we have only used a very limited set of covariates: age 
dummies for the age groups forty to forty-  four, forty-  ﬁ  ve to forty-  nine, ﬁ  fty 
to ﬁ  fty-  four, ﬁ  fty-  ﬁ  ve to ﬁ  fty-  nine, sixty to sixty-  four; year dummies; mari-
tal status (married or not, where married includes cohabitation), and two 
health dummies.
International comparability of self- reported health is a very diﬃcult prob-
lem in itself. Because of this, we have adopted the following simple approach: 
in the United States and European data, respectively, we ﬁ  nd the weighted 
frequency distributions for ages forty to sixty- ﬁ  ve (balanced panel) in the top 
4. To be precise, we use PSID waves 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1999, 2001, and 2003.
5. To be precise, for the years 1995, 1996, and 1997, only the one-  year lags are included; for 
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panel of table 3.2. Based on this we collapse the ﬁ  ve categories into three; 
combining the ﬁ  rst two and the last two, essentially ignoring the wording 
diﬀerences. This leads to the distribution of self-  reported health in the bot-
tom panel of table 3.2. The health distribution is now similar in the United 
States and the European countries. In the analysis section following, we 
discuss what the implications for work disability and labor market participa-
tion would be if health were “the same” in all countries.
Table 3A.4 summarizes for men and women separately some of the key 
dynamic parameters (relating disability and work) estimated from our 
empirical models. While there are diﬀerences between our estimates for men 
and women, these tend to be concentrated in the “oﬀ- diagonal” terms—the 
eﬀects of disability on work status or vice versa. In most countries (but not 
all), the eﬀects of lagged disability on current disability is similar for men 
and women within each country. To the extent that the eﬀect of lagged dis-
ability on current disability measures the pure transitions of work-  related 
health between the waves, the similarity between men and women may not 
be that surprising. In most countries, the eﬀects of lagged employment on 
current employment are higher for men than for women. The traditionally 
more transitory nature of employment for women would imply a smaller 
estimated impact of lagged employment.
With the exception of Belgium and Finland, the estimated eﬀects of 
disability on employment are somewhat larger (in absolute value) for men 
than for women. Disability programs whose generosity depends on a past 
series of contributions would imply greater generosity for men compared to 
women, and this is what we ﬁ  nd. Finally, the eﬀects of lagged employment 
on disability may reﬂ  ect in part the health eﬀects of work. More likely this 
is picking up the unobserved eﬀects of health, which is very incompletely 
captured in this data. Better health increases the likelihood of work and 
makes disability less likely.
Both disability and work status are highly persistent, and signiﬁ  cantly so, 
Table 3.2   Self-  reported health in the PSID and the ECHP data
  United States   European Union  
Original classiﬁ  cation
Excellent 21.3% Very good 16.2%
Very good 26.6% Good 43.4%
Good 29.5% Fair 29.8%
Fair 10.1% Bad 8.6%
Poor 2.5% Very bad 2.0%
Combined classiﬁ  cation
Excellent 57.8% Excellent 59.6%
Good 29.5% Good 29.8%
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across all countries. Current disability is negatively associated with current 
work status in most countries, and the relationship is particularly strong in 
the United States (and for women in Belgium). The evidence for lagged dis-
ability aﬀecting current work status over and above the contemporaneous 
eﬀect is weaker. There is evidence of lagged employment status aﬀecting 
current work disability, however.
As one would probably expect, the parameter estimates for the eﬀects of 
lagged work status on current work status tend to be relatively low in the 
United States, reﬂ  ecting a higher turnover than in the European countries 
(both from working to not working and from not working to working). At 
the low end of the European scale in this respect are the United Kingdom 
and Spain, with the other European countries demonstrating somewhat 
larger eﬀects.
3.6    Discussion
To gain a better understanding of the diﬀerences between the countries, 
we carry out four simulations. The ﬁ  rst simulation simply generates values 
of work and self- reported disability over the sample period in each country, 
using the estimated models. The second simulation replaces the country-
 speciﬁ  c parameter estimates for the disability equation by the corresponding 
U.S. coeﬃcients, but retains the own country work parameters. Conversely, 
the third simulation replaces the country- speciﬁ  c parameter estimates of the 
work equation by U.S. coeﬃcients, but retains the own country disability 
equation. Finally, the fourth simulation replaces the country- speciﬁ  c param-
eters in both equations by U.S. coeﬃcients. In all simulations the initial 
conditions are generated according to the country-  speciﬁ  c estimates.
The ﬁ  gures in the appendix present time paths of two variables: the per-
centage of individuals with a work disability and the percentage of individu-
als working. For each of these variables we produce four values, according 
to the four scenarios sketched previously.
Let us ﬁ  rst concentrate on work disability. The lines represent the sce-
narios where the U.S. disability parameters are used (the lines with triangles) 
or where both the disability parameters and the work parameters come from 
the United States (the lines with the x). The graphs suggest that the ini-
tial conditions only have an eﬀect during the ﬁ  rst couple of years of the 
simulations. The path of disability moves away from its initial position very 
quickly.
In countries where self- reported disability tends to be low, moving to U.S. 
parameters will lead to an increase in self-  reported work disability. This is 
the case for female disability in Belgium, United Kingdom, and the Southern 
European countries, and for disability among males in the United Kingdom, 
Italy, and Spain. In some other cases the simulations with U.S. parameters 
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and Portuguese males. In a number of countries, adopting U.S. parameters 
leads to a dramatic fall in disability. These cases include males and females 
in Germany and Finland, and females in Denmark and the Netherlands.
Another noteworthy aspect of the graphs is that these lines tend to be on 
top of each other for most countries. This suggests that the feedback from 
work to disability is quantitatively similar to that in the United States (since 
the line with triangles uses country-  speciﬁ  c work parameters this should 
generate deviations from the all- U.S. parameters if work had an appreciably 
diﬀerent eﬀect on disability in Europe compared to the United States). Cases 
where the feedback from work to disability appears to make a diﬀerence 
include females in the Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Greece, Spain, 
and Austria. For males the diﬀerence in feedback from work to disability 
seems to be essentially immaterial, with the possible exception of Belgium. 
Inspecting the second column of table 3A.4 suggests that the cases with the 
biggest diﬀerences between the triangled and x lines are indeed the cases 
where the estimated values of  D
W, the eﬀect of lagged work on disability, 
deviate most from the U.S. estimate.
Now consider the bottom part of the graphs; that is, the simulation of 
employment under the diﬀerent scenarios. The simulations with all U.S. 
coeﬃcients lead to ﬁ  nal values that are quite similar across countries: from 
0.66 (Portugal) to 0.75 (Belgium, Ireland) for women, and from 0.76 (Ger-
many) to 0.86 (several countries) for men. The main sources of diﬀerences 
are initial conditions and demographic and health diﬀerences. A second 
observation is that the simulation with all U.S. coeﬃcients leads to the high-
est employment rate in almost all countries, although often it makes only a 
negligible diﬀerence whether European or U.S. coeﬃcients are used for the 
work disability equation. Exceptions are Italy and the United Kingdom, 
where replacing EU disability coeﬃcients by U.S. coeﬃcients leads to higher 
work disability and thus lowers employment. As a consequence, the highest 
employment rate is attained with U.S. work and EU disability coeﬃcients.
This argument, however, does not always work: to further isolate the eﬀect 
of labor market institutions from the eﬀect of disability, it is of interest 
to consider the diﬀerence between the line with triangles (only disability 
parameters from the United States) and the lines with x (all parameters from 
the United States) in more countries. It is instructive to take the Netherlands 
as an example. When looking at females, we note that the simulation with 
U.S. disability coeﬃcients but Dutch work coeﬃcients yields essentially the 
same employment rate, despite the fact that disability is much lower with 
U.S. disability coeﬃcients. Table 3A.4 tells us immediately why this is so. The 
parameter  D
W is close to zero for Dutch females. We also note, however, that 
the line with x (all U.S. parameters) is about 25 percentage points higher than 
the line with triangles. This suggests that independent of the disability sta-
tus of Dutch women, American institutions would generate a much higher 
employment rate. The story for Dutch males is qualitatively similar, but since 74        Arie Kapteyn, James P.  Smith, Arthur van Soest, and James Banks
the employment rate is already high, adopting U.S. coeﬃcients can only have 
a limited eﬀect. With this example in mind we observe that in all countries, 
with the possible exception of Denmark, the United Kingdom, and Ireland, 
labor market institutions, rather than disability, cause the employment rate 
to be low relative to the United States.
One can further investigate this by looking at the lines with squares (EU 
disability parameters, but U.S. work parameters). The relevant comparison 
now is between the lines with squares and the lines with diamonds (all EU 
parameters). Once again we ﬁ  nd that labor market institutions explain the 
diﬀerences in employment rates, rather than diﬀerences in disability.
A diﬀerent way to obtain insight into the diﬀerent dynamics across the 
various countries is to consider transition matrices. These are given in table 
3A.5 (for disability) and table 3A.6 (for work). These key dynamics relate to 
the transitions between work and nonwork and disability and nondisability. 
Each can be summarized by two oﬀ- diagonal transitions. For work, the two 
transitions are the transition from work to nonwork and the transition from 
nonwork to work. Similarly, for disability the oﬀ-  diagonal transitions are 
from not disabled to disabled and from disabled to not disabled. Because 
our interest concerns how all these transition patterns vary across our set 
of countries, tables 3A.7 (for disability) and 3A.8 (for work) summarize 
the key parameters by organizing them by the magnitude of the transitions 
with the country names attached. Finally, since the United States will be the 
benchmark for all countries in our simulations, we list the U.S. parameter 
at the bottom of each list.
Consider ﬁ  rst the disability transitions. We observe considerable variation 
in the inﬂ  ow rates into disability (the transition from being not disabled in 
one period to being disabled the next period). For men these rates vary from 
18 percent in Germany to 4 percent in the United States, United Kingdom, 
and Italy. For women the rates vary from 21 percent in Germany to 5 percent 
in Ireland, Italy, and Belgium. The United States is near the bottom with 6 
percent. On the other hand, outﬂ  ow rates out of disability (the transition 
from being disabled in one period and not disabled in the next period) vary 
less, at least in relative terms. For men the rates vary from 42 percent in Italy 
to 23 percent in Germany and Denmark, while for women the rates vary 
from 49 percent in Italy to 22 percent in Germany.
There are a number of salient patterns to these disability transitions. First, 
while the levels diﬀer between men and women, the country rankings are 
remarkably similar by gender, suggesting that the variation across countries 
is at least partly due to institutional variation aﬀecting men and women in a 
similar way. To illustrate, Germany ranks highest on the transition into dis-
ability for both sexes, while Italy ranks highest in the transition from work 
disability into nonwork disability. Second, for almost all the countries listed 
there exists considerable churning between work and nonwork disability, 
indicating that work disability is far from a permanent condition even at Labor Market Status and Transitions during the Pre-Retirement Years    7 5
these older ages (cf. Kapteyn, Smith, and Van Soest 2007). Consequently, 
cross-  sectional analysis of work disability status will not be able to capture 
some of the main features of work disabilities during the pre-  retirement 
years. Third, compared to the European countries, the United States ranks 
very low on the transition into work disability, while it ranks in the middle 
of the pack in the transitions out of work disability.
Work disability will tend to be high when the transition into work dis-
ability is high, while the transition out of work disability is low. Germany, 
Denmark, and Finland would be the best prototypes of such behavior. On 
the other hand, other countries have a relatively low transition into disability, 
matched with a relatively high transition out of disability. Italy, Greece, and 
Spain would be good illustrations of that behavior and in those countries 
the steady-  state levels of work disability will be low.
Consider next the ranking of the transitions between work and nonwork 
for countries listed in table 3A.8. First, we note that the variation in transi-
tions from work to nonwork varies less across countries than the transitions 
from nonwork to work. Thus, most of the variation across countries in labor 
market dynamics relates to whether persons who are out of the labor force 
are likely to transit back into the labor force. To illustrate, for men, transition 
rates from nonwork to work vary from 31 percent in the United Kingdom 
to as low as 3 percent in Austria and Belgium. Indeed, the countries where 
moving back into the labor force appears to be least likely are very similar 
for men and women alike. These countries would include Italy, France, Bel-
gium, and Austria.
In contrast, the United States has a relatively high rate of transition back 
into the labor force for both sexes compared to all countries. It is in com-
parisons between the United States and Italy, France, Belgium, and Austria, 
that the eﬀects on employment are quite dramatic. For example, the chart 
for Austria in the appendix shows a very low employment rate toward the 
end of the observation period. For women, among the European countries 
the United Kingdom has the highest inﬂ  ow into employment (16 percent), 
while Belgium has the lowest inﬂ  ow (3 percent). The chart for Belgium in 
the appendix conﬁ  rms that female employment in Belgium is very low in 
comparison with other countries.
In sharp contrast, table 3A.8 shows much less variation in transitions from 
work to nonwork, especially for men. The full range of values for men in 
table 3A.8 is only from 0.03 (Denmark) to 0.08 (Germany), with the United 
States at a value of 0.07. In fact, eight of the thirteen European countries 
in table 3A.8 for men lie within 2 percentage points of the U.S. transition 
value from work to not work. Thus, the source of the labor market dynamic 
diﬀerences among these countries appears not to lie in the ease or diﬃculty 
of the transition from work to not- work. Instead, it is the relative rigidity of 
some European countries in discouraging reentry into the labor force that 
appears to be the major issue.76        Arie Kapteyn, James P.  Smith, Arthur van Soest, and James Banks
This is further illustrated by table 3A.9. The last four columns of table 
3A.9 contain the same transition rates as table 3A.8, but in addition, the 
ﬁ  rst two columns contain measures of employment protection and replace-
ment rates at retirement. The employment protection measure is taken from 
OECD (2004) and is the sum of three main components reﬂ  ecting, respec-
tively, (a) diﬃculty of dismissal, (b) procedural inconveniences an employer 
faces in the dismissal process, and (c) severance pay provisions (OECD 2004, 
65). The measure presented here is “version 2, late 1990s” (see table 2.A2.4 
in OECD [2004]). The replacement rate shown in the table is the replace-
ment rate of a worker with average earnings in a country, as calculated in 
OECD (2005). The countries in table 3A.9 have been ranked according to 
the employment protection measure. Somewhat remarkably, it is particularly 
the transitions from nonwork to work that are aﬀected by the employment 
protection index: for both women and men, more employment protection 
implies a smaller transition rate back into employment. A similar ﬁ  nding is 
reported in OECD (2004). On the other hand, the protective eﬀect seems to 
be limited; transition rates out of employment do not correlate signiﬁ  cantly 
with the employment protection measure.
In view of the age range we are considering, a measure of a retirement 
replacement rate has been included, since one would expect that some work-
ers who are temporarily out of the labor force will transit into retirement 
rather than back into employment if that alternative is suﬃciently attractive. 
Table 3A.9 indeed shows the expected negative correlation. However, when 
regressing the transition rates on both the employment protection measure 
and the replacement rate measure we ﬁ  nd the former to be signiﬁ  cant, but 
not the latter.
3.7    Conclusion
In this chapter, we have investigated the dynamics of labor force and 
work disability behavior among individuals between forty and sixty-  ﬁ  ve in 
several Western European countries and the United States. We estimated 
the dynamics of labor force and disability behavior separately for men and 
women using high quality panel data in thirteen European countries and 
the United States. We ﬁ  nd substantial diﬀerences in labor force dynamics 
between the countries. Adopting U.S. parameters (i.e., U.S. institutions and 
norms) often leads to considerable reductions in self-  reported disability. 
Although this has some eﬀect on employment rates, most of the action is in 
the labor market institutions themselves, where adopting U.S. coeﬃcients 
may generate substantially higher employment rates. Comparison of tran-
sition rates with aggregate measures of employment protection suggests 
that these play a major role in generating the observed diﬀerences across 
countries.Labor Market Status and Transitions during the Pre-Retirement Years    7 7
Appendix
Simulated Time Paths of Mild and Severe 
Disability and of Labor Force Status
Fig.  3A.1  Germany
Fig.  3A.2  DenmarkFig.  3A.3  The  Netherlands
Fig.  3A.4  BelgiumFig.  3A.5  France
Fig.  3A.6  United  KingdomFig.  3A.7  Ireland
Fig.  3A.8  ItalyFig.  3A.9  Greece
Fig.  3A.10  SpainFig.  3A.11  Portugal
Fig.  3A.12  AustriaFig.  3A.13  Finland
Table 3A.1  Overview of ECHP waves
Subsample
D L UK
    B   DK   ECHP  SOEP  EL   E   F   IrI   I   ECHP  PSELL  NL   A   P   Fin   S   ECHP  BHPS
1994 — — — —
1995 ——
1996 —
1997 — — —
1998 — — —
1999 — — —
2000 — — —
2001          —                           —                           —    
Note: ECHP   European Community Household Panel; SOEP   Socio-  Economic Panel; PSELL   Panel socio- 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 3A.4  Work disability and employment dynamics: Key parameter estimates











         D
D    D
W    D
W    W
W     D
W
Germany Men 0.725 –0.422 –0.432 1.973 –0.200
Women 0.572 –0.244 –0.285 1.356 –0.143
Denmark Men 1.011 –0.763 –0.587 1.841 –0.575
Women 0.780 –0.743 –0.559 1.826 –0.497
Netherlands Men 0.842 –0.789 –0.236 2.007 –0.762
Women 0.854 0.041 –0.068 1.516 –0.095
Belgium Men 1.225 0.231 –0.193 3.105 –0.211
Women 0.983 –1.344 –0.500 2.452 –1.221
France Men 0.814 –0.348 –0.234 2.541 –0.306
Women 0.875 –0.446 –0.184 2.495 –0.139
United Kingdom Men 1.153 –0.249 –0.037 1.541 –0.157
Women 0.835 –0.244 –0.075 1.418 0.037
Ireland Men 0.948 –0.728 –0.197 2.034 –0.670
Women 1.133 –0.030 –0.073 1.723 –0.532
Italy Men 1.023 –0.315 –0.198 2.093 –0.403
Women 0.683 0.011 0.012 1.725 –0.076
Greece Men 0.935 –0.255 0.165 2.063 –0.411
Women 0.931 –0.122 –0.021 1.510 –0.161
Spain Men 0.738 –0.665 –0.650 1.701 –0.541
Women 0.749 –0.147 –0.239 1.175 –0.416
Portugal Men 1.021 –0.104 0.127 2.316 –0.459
Women 0.958 –0.097 –0.108 1.920 –0.110
Austria Men 0.758 –0.437 –0.375 2.863 –0.444
Women 0.936 –0.266 –0.413 2.213 –0.199
Finland Men 0.977 –0.348 –0.284 1.765 –0.284
Women 0.978 –0.038 –0.363 1.403 –0.524
United States Men 1.064 –0.643 –0.308 1.643 –0.995
    Women   0.841   –0.558   –0.202   1.447   –0.778
Notes: Results for the United States are coeﬃcients on one- year lagged variables, although two- year lags 
are also included to control for the varying periodicity of PSID data. All speciﬁ  cations also include year 
dummies, controls for education, age group, marital status, self-  reported general health status, and (in 
the U.S. case) ethnicity. Equations for the initial conditions use the same variable.Table 3A.5  Transition probabilities for disability status actual
Men Women
    Not disabled   Disabled   Not disabled   Disabled
Germany
  Not  disabled 0.82 0.18 0.79 0.21
  Disabled 0.23 0.77 0.22 0.78
Denmark
  Not  disabled 0.82 0.12 0.88 0.12
  Disabled 0.23 0.77 0.28 0.72
Netherlands
  Not  disabled 0.92 0.08 0.89 0.11
  Disabled 0.29 0.71 0.26 0.74
Belgium
  Not  disabled 0.95 0.05 0.95 0.05
  Disabled 0.34 0.66 0.29 0.71
France
  Not  disabled 0.91 0.09 0.90 0.10
  Disabled 0.31 0.69 0.30 0.70
United Kingdom
  Not  disabled 0.96 0.04 0.93 0.07
  Disabled 0.26 0.74 0.31 0.69
Ireland
  Not  disabled 0.93 0.07 0.95 0.05
  Disabled 0.31 0.69 0.34 0.65
Italy
  Not  disabled 0.96 0.04 0.95 0.05
  Disabled 0.42 0.58 0.49 0.51
Greece
  Not  disabled 0.94 0.06 0.93 0.07
  Disabled 0.37 0.63 0.37 0.63
Spain
  Not  disabled 0.93 0.07 0.91 0.09
  Disabled 0.37 0.63 0.40 0.60
Portugal
  Not  disabled 0.92 0.08 0.90 0.10
  Disabled 0.28 0.72 0.27 0.74
Austria
  Not  disabled 0.91 0.09 0.91 0.09
  Disabled 0.35 0.65 0.36 0.64
Finland
  Not  disabled 0.88 0.12 0.87 0.13
  Disabled 0.25 0.75 0.26 0.74
United States
  Not  disabled 0.96 0.04 0.94 0.06
  Disabled   0.26   0.74   0.29   0.71Table 3A.6  Transition probabilities for labor force status actual
Men Women
    Does not work   Works   Does not work   Works
Germany
  Does  not  work 0.89 0.11 0.91 0.09
  Works 0.08 0.92 0.10 0.90
Denmark
  Does  not  work 0.84 0.16 0.86 0.14
  Works 0.03 0.97 0.06 0.94
Netherlands
  Does  not  work 0.86 0.14 0.92 0.08
  Works 0.04 0.96 0.09 0.91
Belgium
  Does  not  work 0.97 0.03 0.97 0.03
  Works 0.04 0.96 0.07 0.93
France
  Does  not  work 0.92 0.08 0.94 0.05
  Works 0.05 0.95 0.06 0.93
United Kingdom
  Does  not  work 0.69 0.31 0.84 0.16
  Works 0.06 0.94 0.10 0.90
Ireland
  Does  not  work 0.87 0.13 0.93 0.07
  Works 0.04 0.96 0.11 0.89
Italy
  Does  not  work 0.91 0.09 0.97 0.03
  Works 0.07 0.93 0.10 0.90
Greece
  Does  not  work 0.88 0.12 0.94 0.07
  Works 0.05 0.95 0.15 0.85
Spain
  Does  not  work 0.85 0.15 0.94 0.06
  Works 0.07 0.93 0.14 0.86
Portugal
  Does  not  work 0.89 0.12 0.92 0.08
  Works 0.04 0.96 0.09 0.91
Austria
  Does  not  work 0.97 0.03 0.96 0.04
  Works 0.07 0.93 0.09 0.91
Finland
  Does  not  work 0.87 0.13 0.87 0.13
  Works 0.06 0.94 0.07 0.93
United States
  Does  not  work 0.80 0.20 0.74 0.2603
  W o r k s   0.07   0.93   0.037   0.97Table 3A.7  Ordering of transitions in disability states by country
Men Women
Transition   Countries   Transition   Countries
A Not disabled to disabled
.18 Germany .21 Germany
.12 Denmark, Finland .13 Finland
.09 France, Austria .12 Denmark
.08 Netherlands, Portugal .11 Netherlands
.07 Ireland, Spain .10 France, Portugal
.06 Greece .09 Austria, Spain
.05 Belgium .07 Greece, United Kingdom
.04 Italy, United Kingdom .05 Belgium, Ireland, Italy
United States   .04 United States   .06
B Disabled to not disabled
.42 Italy .49 Italy
.37 Greece, Spain .40 Spain
.35 Austria .37 Greece
.34 Belgium .36 Austria
.31 France, Ireland .34 Ireland
.29 Netherlands .31 United Kingdom
.28 Portugal .30 France
.26 United Kingdom .29 Belgium
.25 Finland .28 Denmark
.23 Germany, Denmark .27 Portugal
.26 Netherlands, Finland
.22 Germany
    United States   .26       United States   .29Table 3A.8  Ordering of work transitions by country
Men Women
Transition   Countries   Transition   Countries
A Work to not work
.08 Germany .15 Greece
.07 Italy, Spain, Austria .14 Spain
.06 United Kingdom, Finland .11 Ireland
.05 France, Greece .10 Germany, United Kingdom, Italy
.04 Netherlands, Belgium .09 Netherlands, Portugal, Austria
Ireland, Portugal .07 Belgium, Finland
.03 Denmark .06 Denmark, France
United States   .07 United States   .04
B Not work to work
.31 United Kingdom
.16 Denmark .16 United Kingdom
.15 Spain .14 Denmark
.14 Netherlands .13 Finland
.13 Ireland, Finland .09 Germany
.12 Greece, Portugal .08 Portugal, Netherlands
.11 Germany .07 Ireland, Greece
.09 Italy .06 Spain
.08 France .05 France
.03 Belgium, Austria .04 Austria
.03 Belgium, Italy
    United States   .20       United States   .26









     
Work to 
not work  
Not work 
to work  
Work to 
not work  
Not work 
to work
Portugal 3.7 79.8 0.04 0.12 0.09 0.08
Greece 3.5 99.9 0.05 0.12 0.15 0.07
Italy 3.1 88.8 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.03
Spain 3.0 88.3 0.07 0.15 0.14 0.06
France 2.8 68.8 0.05 0.08 0.06 0.05
Germany 2.6 71.8 0.08 0.11 0.10 0.09
Belgium 2.5 63.1 0.04 0.03 0.07 0.03
Austria 2.4 93.2 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.04
Netherlands 2.3 84.1 0.04 0.14 0.09 0.08
Finland 2.2 78.8 0.06 0.13 0.07 0.13
Denmark 1.8 54.1 0.03 0.16 0.06 0.14
Ireland 1.2 36.6 0.04 0.13 0.11 0.07
United Kingdom 1.0 47.6 0.06 0.31 0.10 0.16
United States 0.7 51.0 0.07 0.20  0.04 0.26
correlation with  0.81 –0.02 –0.57 0.45 –0.70
 OECD  measurea [.001] [.96] [.03] [.10] [.005]
correlation with  0.28 –0.46 0.46 –0.50
 replacement  ratea          [.32]   [.09]   [.10]   [.07]
Note: See text for explanation.
aSigniﬁ  cance level in square brackets.92        Arie Kapteyn, James P.  Smith, Arthur van Soest, and James Banks
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